New approaches to crisis resolution: Weighing the options (A comment)
Comments on: Barry Eichengreen, Kenneth Kletzer, and Ashoka Mody who describe the debate over collective action clauses, which have been considered by the G-7,G-10, G-20, G-22, G-30, Institute of International Finance (IIF),International Monetary Fund, International Monetary and Financial Committee(IMFC), Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), Emerging Markets Credit Association (EMCA), a variety of finance ministries, and others no doubt—although not, to my knowledge, the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). For those who have not received a merit badge in the language of internationalbureaucrats, collective action clauses allow a specified majority of bondholders to represent the interests of the totality of issuers in renegotiations with the issuer.
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- Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen Reinhart & Carlos A. Vegh, 2003.
"The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion,"
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10061, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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