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Securing solidarity

Author

Listed:
  • Lisa Bruttel

    (University of Potsdam, CEPA)

  • Eva Markowsky

    (University of Potsdam, CEPA)

Abstract

Individuals who speak out against autocratic tendencies are taking a significant personal risk. This study tests whether forming preventive solidarity networks increases the likelihood of solidarity. In a laboratory experiment, we use an adapted version of the solidarity game, in which one of four group members may lose all their money at random. All group members decide how much they want to give to the individual who lost their endowment. Comparing two treatments with and without communication, we find that ex-ante communication substantially increases solidarity. In a further treatment, we inform participants that forming explicit agreements during the communication would be beneficial. This subtle suggestion doubles the effectiveness of communication in terms of solidarity. Further analysis suggests that, in our setting, solidarity is contingent on trusting that others will behave in a similar way. Higher trust in humans predicts a greater willingness to give, most likely because generally trusting individuals anticipate more solidarity from others towards them as well. The informational hint appears to foster such trust within the group strongly, rendering general trust irrelevant for one’s own solidaristic behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa Bruttel & Eva Markowsky, 2026. "Securing solidarity," CEPA Discussion Papers 104, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
    • Handle: RePEc:pot:cepadp:104
    DOI: 10.25932/publishup-70889
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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