The level of CEO compensation for the short and long-term - a view on high-tech firms
This study examines the relationship between corporate performance and the Chief Executive Officer compensation in high-technology firms in the S&P 1500. The total CEO compensation and short and long-term compensations were tested regarding corporate performance. A panel data SUR model is estimated and describes the total compensation and cash compensation as a proportion of total pay for the period between 2000 and 2010 in high-technologies firms. The findings indicate that there is a strong and positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance. This econometric study provides a better understanding on the relationship between CEO compensation and performance in high-technologies firms.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2013|
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