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Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game

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  • Sourav Bhattacharya

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  • Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game," Working Paper 326, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jun 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:326
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    File URL: http://www.econ.pitt.edu/papers/Sourav_Aggregation-v5.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and seek in Arizona," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 273-293, December.
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    3. Lau, Richard R. & Sigelman, Lee & Heldman, Caroline & Babbitt, Paul, 1999. "The Effects of Negative Political Advertisements: A Meta-Analytic Assessment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 851-875, December.
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    6. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
    7. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    8. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    9. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    10. Shachat, Jason M., 2002. "Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 189-226, May.
    11. Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-132, April.
    12. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Hess, Gregory D., 1996. "A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 209-229, December.
    13. Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477.
    14. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    15. Polborn, Mattias K. & David T., Yi, 2006. "Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(4), pages 351-371, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Georgy Egorov, 2015. "Single-Issue Campaigns and Multidimensional Politics," NBER Working Papers 21265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "The Voters' Curses: The Upsides and Downsides of Political Engagement," MPRA Paper 53482, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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