Reputation in the Market for Stolen Data
Internet commerce has made it easier to compare prices and shop online.� However, it has also exposed consumers to a new kind of crime in the form of the electronic theft of payment details.� However the skills required to successfully intercept payment data differ from the skills required to use that information for oneâ€™s own gain.� This creates gains to trade between those who steal the data and those who know how to use it.� This particular illicit market has the added disadvantage that trade takes place online and the only identification of any paticular trader comes from a username which can be changed at zero cost.� This paper examines the reputation mechanisms that keep this market working and considers whether they might constitute an Achillesâ€™ Heel that governments keen to reduce crime might exploit.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 2012|
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