Reputation in the Market for Stolen Data
Internet commerce has made it easier to compare prices and shop online. However, it has also exposed consumers to a new kind of crime in the form of the electronic theft of payment details. However the skills required to successfully intercept payment data differ from the skills required to use that information for one’s own gain. This creates gains to trade between those who steal the data and those who know how to use it.This particular illicit market has the added disadvantage that trade takes place online and the only identification of any paticular trader comes from a username which can be changed at zero cost. This paper examines the reputation mechanisms that keep this market working and considers whether they might constitute an Achilles’ Heel that governments keen to reduce crime might exploit.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 2012|
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