The Game Theory Applied to FIFA World Cup Matches: Evidences for Strategic Equilibrium in Austria - Algerian and Iran, interdependent outcomes

This study analyses game theory as applied to an example that occurred during the FIFA World Cup. The matches in question are, of course, those between the national teams of Austria and Algeria, and those involving a third national football team, ranked amongst the best third-placed teams, namely the Iranian national team. Thus, the three teams are regarded as players A and B, with player C being the third party, respectively. Game theory applied to these teams during the World Cup matches shows that, in a context of interdependence, the decisions made by the players in dynamic interactions ultimately have a significant impact on the third party, namely player C. Thus, the evidence suggests, in particular, that a victory for the Austrian team could, in fact, guarantee the Iranian team’s qualification; on the other hand, a victory for the Algerian team would, naturally, guarantee the Iranian team’s qualification; thus, decisions benefiting one of the teams would, naturally, have a plausible and significant effect directly related to the Iranian team’s qualification. Considering a draw between the two national teams, on the other hand, this ultimately resulted in the elimination of the Iranian team and, naturally, in the qualification of both teams, Austria and Algeria; a draw between the two teams is, naturally, regarded in this approach as a dominant strategy. In this particular approach, the evidence shows that decisions tending to benefit two distinct players naturally exert a direct influence on the third player. Both teams decided to draw the match, considering this to be the best strategy for both sides; traditional game theory applied to businesses shows that the success of two companies that decide to cooperate depends both on the companies themselves and, on the other hand, on the other market players; however, this approach differs significantly from the current one. In the current approach, the actions of a third party have little significant relevance to the other parties in a dynamic strategic interaction, as the evidence in fact suggests