From Governance to Government? The European Commission and the three faces of politicisation

Research on the politicisation of the European Union has concentrated on reactive, bottom-up contestation of existing EU action. This article argues that such an understanding is incomplete because it conflates politicisation of issues with politicisation of institutions. We distinguish three faces of politicisation. Reactive politicisation refers to the public contestation of existing EU competences. Proactive politicisation occurs when supranational actors claim a political mandate in order to justify wider discretion. Induced politicisation emerges when intergovernmental conflict over already politicized state functions creates a vacuum that the Commission can try to fill, thereby inheriting the political character of the function itself. The empirical sections focus on induced politicisation. They reconstruct three episodes: Jean-Claude Juncker's attempt to use EMU deadlock to place the Commission at the centre of euro-area reform; the failed institutionalisation of an EU Finance Minister, a euro-area fiscal capacity, and a more political treasury function; and Ursula von der Leyen's attempts to centralise foreign-policy initiative during successive geopolitical crises. The argument is that politicisation does not only constrain supranational action. Under specific institutional conditions it can also widen supranational authority by transforming the Commission from guardian of the Treaties into a proto-governmental executive.