IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/osfxxx/bwz6m_v1.html

The Ultimatum–Dictator Offer Gap in the Lab

Author

Listed:
  • Zíka, Vojtěch
  • Alfonso, Tomáš
  • Flegr, Jaroslav

Abstract

In an incentivized laboratory experiment (N = 212), we tested whether a measure capturing both the difference between offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games and their distance from zero may be a better predictor of intrinsic altruism than the commonly used Dictator Game offer. Participants took part in a within-subjects, dual-role Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game, followed by a modified version of the Die-under-the-cup Task, in which they could cheat either to benefit themselves or a charity. The experimental games were followed by the Self-Reported Altruism Scale and additional short surveys. The main results showed that although our measure outperformed the Dictator Game offer in predicting altruism, neither was significantly associated with task- or survey-based altruism. Perhaps the most interesting result emerged from the exploratory analysis: the Ultimatum–Dictator Gap—the difference between offers in the two games, and part of our proposed measure—appears to be the strongest predictor of survey-measured altruism. It also positively correlates with the time taken to make an Ultimatum Game offer (suggesting lower cognitive load when gauging the social norm) and with dishonesty. In contrast, it is negatively correlated with political orientation, with economically right-leaning participants showing a larger gap than left-leaning ones. This study offers preliminary support for the idea that integrating Dictator and Ultimatum Game offers—whether as a single gap or a more nuanced measure—may better capture altruistic tendencies than relying on the Dictator Game alone. Nonetheless, further research is needed to confirm and extend these findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Zíka, Vojtěch & Alfonso, Tomáš & Flegr, Jaroslav, 2025. "The Ultimatum–Dictator Offer Gap in the Lab," OSF Preprints bwz6m_v1, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:bwz6m_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/bwz6m_v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/687503dfdabc1b73a29c1dd9/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/bwz6m_v1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September.
    2. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    3. Cochard, François & Le Gallo, Julie & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2021. "Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. David Cooper & E. Dutcher, 2011. "The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(4), pages 519-546, November.
    5. Chao Yang & Yanli Wang & Yuhui Wang & Xuemeng Zhang & Yong Liu & Hong Chen, 2020. "The Effect of Sense of Community Responsibility on Residents’ Altruistic Behavior: Evidence from the Dictator Game," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(2), pages 1-10, January.
    6. Candelo, Natalia & Eckel, Catherine & Johnson, Cathleen, 2019. "The proposer’s behavior in the ultimatum game in 11 Mexican villages," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 5-8.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zíka, Vojtěch & Olšová, Petra & Jánská, Michaela, 2025. "The attitude–behavior gap is not one-sided: Some do more for the environment than they believe," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fehr, Dietmar & Müller, Daniel & Preuss, Marcel, 2024. "Social mobility perceptions and inequality acceptance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 366-384.
    2. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2014. "Reference Dependent Altruism," MPRA Paper 52774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Wettstein, Dominik J. & Boes, Stefan, 2022. "How value-based policy interventions influence price negotiations for new medicines: An experimental approach and initial evidence," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 112-121.
    4. Agnes Bäker & Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2012. "On the Context-Dependency of Inequality Aversion - Experimental Evidence and a Stylized Model -," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-023, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019. "Technology adoption and pro-social preferences," CEE-M Working Papers halshs-02291905, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
    6. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    7. James Bland & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2013. "Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2013_19, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    8. Engelmann, Dirk, 2012. "How not to extend models of inequality aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 599-605.
    9. Benito Arruñada & Marco Casari & Francesca Pancotto, 2012. "Are self-regarding subjects more rational?," Economics Working Papers 1306, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    10. Sylvie Thoron, 2016. "Morality Beyond Social Preferences: Smithian Sympathy, Social Neuroscience and the Nature of Social Consciousness [La moralité au delà des préférences sociales. La sympathie Smithienne, les neurosciences sociales et la nature d’une conscience soci," Post-Print hal-01645043, HAL.
    11. David Macro & Jeroen Weesie, 2016. "Inequalities between Others Do Matter: Evidence from Multiplayer Dictator Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-23, April.
    12. Frank Cowell & Marc Fleurbaey & Bertil Tungodden, 2015. "The tyranny puzzle in social preferences: an empirical investigation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 765-792, December.
    13. Cabeza Martínez, Begoña, 2023. "Social preferences, support for redistribution, and attitudes towards vulnerable groups," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    14. Nicolas Jacquemet & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2014. "What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 243-264, December.
    15. Christoph Engel & Paul A. M. Van Lange, 2021. "Social mindfulness is normative when costs are low, but rapidly declines with increases in costs," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(2), pages 290-322, March.
    16. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2017. "Decisiveness, peace, and inequality in games of conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 216-229.
    17. Sophie Cetre & Max Lobeck & Claudia Senik & Thierry Verdier, 2018. "In search of unanimously preferred income distributions. Evidence from a choice experiment," Working Papers halshs-01863359, HAL.
    18. Volker Benndorf & Dorothea Kübler & Hans-Theo Normann, 2017. "Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(04), pages 1-18, December.
    19. Hamilton, Stephen & Ouvrard, Benjamin, 2025. "Fair Pricing and Structural Excess Supply," 2025 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2025, Denver, CO 360647, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Josie I. Chen & Kenju Kamei, 2018. "Disapproval aversion or inflated inequity acceptance? The impact of expressing emotions in ultimatum bargaining," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 836-857, December.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:bwz6m_v1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://osf.io/preprints/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.