Optimal Dynamic Auctions
We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for a unit as well as the time by which she must make the purchase are private information. In this environment, we derive the revenue maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible selling mechanism.
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- Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2004. "Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach," Discussion Papers 1397, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
- Border, Kim C, 1991. "Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1175-87, July.
- Simon Board, 2008. "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 391-413.
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