IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/npf/wpaper/12-106.html

New Thinking on Corporate Bond Market in India

Author

Listed:
  • Banerji, Sanjay
  • Gangopadhyay, Krishna
  • Patnaik, Ila

    (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)

  • Shah, Ajay

    (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)

Abstract

What are major factors behind underdevelopment of corporate bond market in India? One of the major bottlenecks to the development of this market lies in relatively larger costs of financing which dissuade the firms to raise finance from this avenue. Policies that ensure better production of information and increased volume of transactions will lessen both liquidity and transparency problems and ensure efficient market making. [Working Paper 6/2012-DEA ]. URL:[http://finmin.nic.in/WorkingPaper/CorpBond_Market_India.pdf].
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Banerji, Sanjay & Gangopadhyay, Krishna & Patnaik, Ila & Shah, Ajay, 2012. "New Thinking on Corporate Bond Market in India," Working Papers 12/106, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:npf:wpaper:12/106
    Note: Working Paper 106, 2012
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/WP-2012_106.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    2. Basu, Kaushik, 1986. "The market for land : An analysis of interim transactions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 163-177.
    3. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ms. Prachi Mishra & Mr. Peter J Montiel & Rajeswari Sengupta, 2016. "Monetary Transmission in Developing Countries: Evidence from India," IMF Working Papers 2016/167, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Anand, Vaibhav & Sengupta, Rajeswari, 2014. "Corporate Debt Market in India: Lessons from the South African Experience," MPRA Paper 57465, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Pradeepta Sethi, 2018. "Paradox of external finance in the Indian manufacturing sector," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 95-111, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Angelo Baglioni & Luca Colombo, 2009. "Managers’ Compensation And Misreporting: A Costly State Verification Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 278-289, April.
    2. Gilles Chemla & Katrin Tinn, 2020. "Learning Through Crowdfunding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1783-1801, May.
    3. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2014. "Financing capacity investment under demand uncertainty," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-14-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    4. Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2019. "Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(3), pages 1363-1429, June.
    5. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2021. "Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(3), pages 1253-1278.
    6. Dasgupta, Amil & Burkart, Mike, 2020. "Competition for flow and and short-termism in activism," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 106516, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Bougheas, Spiros & Wang, Tianxi, 2021. "A theory of outside equity: Financing multiple projects," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    9. Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2012. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 1-28, February.
    10. Scheuer, Florian, 2013. "Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1333-1360.
    11. Jan Starmans, 2023. "Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 3003-3024, May.
    12. Eric S. Chou & Chien-Lung Chen, 2015. "Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1069-1090, October.
    13. Spiros Bougheas & Tianxi Wang, 2015. "Optimal Organization of Financial Intermediaries," CESifo Working Paper Series 5452, CESifo.
    14. Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2011. "Financial Contracting Under Imperfect Enforcement," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 323-371.
    15. Milton Harris & Christian C. Opp & Marcus M. Opp, 2025. "Intermediary Capital and the Credit Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(1), pages 162-183, January.
    16. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2019. "Financing Capacity with Stealing and Shirking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5128-5141, November.
    17. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2018. "Financing Capacity Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: An Optimal Contracting Approach," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 85-96, February.
    18. Dang, Viet Anh, 2010. "Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 75-89, February.
    19. Biffis, Enrico & Blake, David, 2010. "Securitizing and tranching longevity exposures," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 186-197, February.
    20. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2016. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 741-767, October.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:npf:wpaper:12/106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: S.Siva Chidambaram The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask S.Siva Chidambaram to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nipfp.org.in .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.