Designing Central Bank Loss Functions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2010. "Designing Central Bank Loss Functions," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 9(1), pages 77-81, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1997.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
- Lars E.O. Svensson, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hallett Andrew Hughes & Weymark Diana N., 2005.
"Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design,"
German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0202, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Guillermo Calvo, 1978. "Some Notes on Time Inconsistency and Rawls' Maximin Criterion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(1), pages 97-102.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2006. "Heterogeneity In A Currency Union With Social Market Objectives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(1), pages 129-152, February.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2011.
"The Optimality And Controllability Of Monetary Policy Through Delegation With Consistent Targets,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(1), pages 82-106, February.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2009. "The Optimality and Controllability of Monetary Policy through Delegation with Consistent Targets," Working Papers 0909, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2011.
"The Optimality And Controllability Of Monetary Policy Through Delegation With Consistent Targets,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(1), pages 82-106, February.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2006. "The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models," Working papers 2006-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2009.
- Yuan, Huiping & Miller, Stephen M., 2010.
"Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 737-745, May.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2009. "Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules," Working Papers 0911, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2011.
"The Optimality And Controllability Of Monetary Policy Through Delegation With Consistent Targets,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(1), pages 82-106, February.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2009. "The Optimality and Controllability of Monetary Policy through Delegation with Consistent Targets," Working Papers 0909, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics.
- Yuan, Huiping & Miller, Stephen M., 2010.
"Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 737-745, May.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2007. "A General Schema for Optimal Monetary Policymaking: Objectives and Rules," Working papers 2007-19, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2006.
"The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy,"
Working papers
2006-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2009.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2009. "The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy," Working Papers 0910, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics.
- Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
- Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
- Jensen Christian, 2020. "Discretion rather than rules? Outdated optimal commitment plans versus discretionary policymaking," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-9, January.
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
- Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J, 2003.
"Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 763-785, October.
- RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco .J., 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Cahiers de recherche 2001-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Mr. Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," IMF Working Papers 2001/161, International Monetary Fund.
- Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Working Papers 0106, Banco de España.
- Ruge-Murcia, F.J., 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Cahiers de recherche 2001-04, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Sibert, Anne & Mihov, Ilian, 2002.
"Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ilian Mihov & Anne Sibert, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 232002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Tootell, Geoffrey M. B., 1999. "Whose monetary policy is it anyway?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 217-235, February.
- Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004.
"Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
- James B. Bullard & Christopher J. Waller, 2002. "Central bank design in general equilibrium," Working Papers 1998-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Franz R. Hahn & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Zur Fundierung des Designs des Europäischen Zentralbanksystems," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 72(1), pages 49-60, January.
- Mihailov, Alexander & Ullrich, Katrin, 2007.
"Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
07-044, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Alexander Mihailov & Katrin Ullrich, 2008. "Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2008-72, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
- Ratti, Ronald A, 2002.
"On Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers and Inflation and Exchange-Rate-Targeting Regimes,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(3), pages 678-685, August.
- Ronald A. Ratti, 1999. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers and Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Regimes," Macroeconomics 9902001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Weymark, Diana N., 2007. "Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
- Bohn, Frank, 2013. "Grand corruption instead of commitment? Reconsidering time-inconsistency of monetary policy," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 478-490.
- Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Beyond Trade – Is Reform Effort Affected by the Exchange Rate Regime? A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 107, pages 29-58.
More about this item
Keywords
Consistent policy; Optimal policy; Consistent targets;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2009-03-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2009-03-22 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2009-03-22 (Monetary Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nlv:wpaper:0908. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bill Robinson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/denlvus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.