Searching, Matching and Education: a Note
In this paper the individual optimal level of education is set in a frictional labor market, where matching is not perfect. Also search frictions are a function of the average education can improve economic efficiency, not only through improvements in workers productivity, but also making the matching process more efficient, and thus reducing the unemployment level.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Derek Laing & Theodore Palivos & Ping Wang, 1995. "Learning, Matching and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 115-129.
- Daron Acemoglu, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 445-464.
- Daron Acemoglu, 1996. "A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 779-804.
- Bagliano, Fabio-Cesare & Bertola, Giuseppe, 2007. "Models for Dynamic Macroeconomics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199228324.
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