More on the dynamic Vickrey mechanism for multi-unit auctions: an experimental study on the emission permits initial auction
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the multiple-units auction literature, by testing the performance of the dynamic Vickrey auction (the Ausubel model), in an experimental setting, representing the functioning of an emission permits market with an Ausubel auction for the initial allocation of permits. Other features of the experiment include the possibility of banking and the inclusion of uncertainty, and the parameters were set so as to replicate an environment similar to the EU-ETS market.Our results reveal that emission permits are not exactly allocated as theoretically predicted in the Ausubel auction although the differences are not statistically significant.Comparison of our results with previous experimental studies on the same auction mechanism, although under very different conditions, indicate no relevant differences exist on the Ausubel auction performance, which is an important policy indication when decisions are being taken on the implementation of several auctions for multiple units, namely in the context of the EU-ETS.
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