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Oligopoly Deregulation in General Equilibrium: A Tax Neutralization Result

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  • Gilbert E. Metcalf
  • George Norman

Abstract

We examine the interplay between market structure and the form that commodity taxation should take in a general equilibrium model in which firms produce differentiated products and so are able to exert market power. Our analysis takes account of two important recent developments that affect market structure and so the appropriate design and effectiveness of commodity taxation: market deregulation and technological change. When market deregulation facilitates price discrimination, we find that tax policy is ineffective as a means to influence market structure. We further show that when tax rates are set optimally government is able to neutralize the potentially detrimental welfare impact of restrictive entry conditions in the differentiated product sector. Finally, we present conditions under which price discrimination is welfare improving.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilbert E. Metcalf & George Norman, 2003. "Oligopoly Deregulation in General Equilibrium: A Tax Neutralization Result," NBER Working Papers 9416, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9416
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Darlene C. Chisholm & George Norman, 2002. "Spatial Competition and Demand: An Application to Motion Pictures," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0216, Department of Economics, Tufts University.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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