Medicare Policy in the 1990s
I describe several changes to Medicare in the 1990s, their rationale, and their likely effects. I focus principally on issues in the administered price systems Medicare uses to pay medical providers, especially those used for post-acute care providers, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), and physicians. The changes to these systems in the 1990s, although directed at important problems, have introduced new and serious problems of their own. For example, the post-acute care system now pays different amounts for the same service, depending on the site of care, and the HMO system is on a trajectory to pay substantially less than traditional Medicare in high rate areas and more in low rate areas, thereby unbalancing local medical markets. I consider future directions for the program, including its long-term financing and a prescription drug benefit.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph P. Newhouse, 2001. "Medical Care Price Indices: Problems and Opportunities / The Chung-Hua Lectures," NBER Working Papers 8168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark McClellan, 1997. "Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 91-128, 03.
- Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
- Kominski, Gerald F. & Long, Stephen H., 1997. "Medicare's disproportionate share adjustment and the cost of low-income patients," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 177-190, April.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
- David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466.
- Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8531. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.