Producers and Predators
This paper explores a series of general-equilibrium models in which people can choose to be either producers or predators, and in which producers can allocate their resources either to production or to guarding their production against predators. The analysis shows how the ratio of predators to producers and the social cost of predation depend on the technology of predation, on the interpersonal distribution of productive resources, and in an fundamental way on whether the decision to allocate resources to guarding against predators is made individually or collectively.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Pacific Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 169-187, 1998.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Herschel I. Grossman & M. Kim, 1997.
"Human Capital and Predation: A Positive Theory of Educational Policy,"
97-30, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 1998. "Human Capital and Predation: A Positive Theory of Educational Policy," NBER Working Papers 6403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Herschel I., 2002.
""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 1997. ""Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State," NBER Working Papers 6289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Easterly, W & Levine, R, 1996.
"Africa's Growth Tragedy : Policies and Ethnic Divisions,"
536, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
- William Easterly & Ross Levine, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-1250.
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"Predation, Efficiency, and Inequality,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(3), pages 393-, September.
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1243-1284.
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