Strategic Trade Policy When Domestic Firms Compete Against Vertically Integrated Rivals
This paper models the international competition between a domestic firm and its vertically integrated foreign rival. The domestic firm has the choice of developing its own production capability for an intermediate input, or of importing it from the foreign firm at a price set by the latter. In this setting, and under reasonable cost assumptions, the foreign firm will always choose to supply the domestic firm as long as it cannot monopolize the final-good market by withholding supply. A tariff placed on the imports of the input by the home government will be borne entirely by the foreign firm, and will be welfare increasing. When the home government chooses to subsidize the domestic firm's fixed development costs for the input, the optimal subsidy will exceed the total fixed costs required, but will not have to be disbursed in equilibrium. A tariff on the final good will enhance the home firm's profits not only by increasing the costs of its rival, but also by reducing its own input costs.
|Date of creation:||Apr 1989|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as "Strategic Trade Policy with Potential for Import Substitution," Journal of Economic Development, Vol. 20, #1, 1995.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981.
"Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-89, August.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1980. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Working Papers 414, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Barbara J. Spencer & Ronald W. Jones, 1989.
"Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
2920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Spencer, Barbara J & Jones, Ronald W, 1991. "Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 153-70, January.
- Jones, R.W. & Spencer, B.J., 1989. "Vertical Foreclosure And International Trade Policy," RCER Working Papers 194, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May.
- Mallela, Parthasaradhi & Nahata, Babu, 1980. "Theory of Vertical Control with Variable Proportions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 1009-25, October.
- Vernon, John M & Graham, Daniel A, 1971. "Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 924-25, July-Aug..
- Katz, Michael L, 1987. "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 154-67, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2916. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.