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Electoral Concerns Reduce Restrictive Measures During the COVID-19 Pandemic

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  • Massimo Pulejo
  • Pablo Querubín

Abstract

The outbreak of COVID-19 has called for swift action by governments, often involving the adoption of restrictive measures such as lockdowns. In this context, leaders have faced a trade-off between imposing stringent measures to limit the contagion, and minimizing the costs on their national economy, which could impact their electoral prospects. Leveraging on both the timing of elections and the constitutional term limits faced by leaders, we document how incumbents who can run for re-election implement less stringent restrictions when the election is closer in time. The effect is driven by measures more likely to have a negative economic impact. This shows how electoral concerns help explain the observed differences in the response to COVID-19 across different countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Pulejo & Pablo Querubín, 2020. "Electoral Concerns Reduce Restrictive Measures During the COVID-19 Pandemic," NBER Working Papers 27498, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27498
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    As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
    1. > Economics of Welfare > Health Economics > Economics of Pandemics > Specific pandemics > Covid-19 > Politics

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    Cited by:

    1. Fazio, Andrea & Reggiani, Tommaso & Sabatini, Fabio, 2022. "The political cost of sanctions: Evidence from COVID-19," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(9), pages 872-878.
    2. Fazio, Andrea & Reggiani, Tommaso G. & Sabatini, Fabio, 2021. "The Political Cost of Lockdown's Enforcement," IZA Discussion Papers 14032, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Antoci, Angelo & Sabatini, Fabio & Sacco, Pier Luigi & Sodini, Mauro, 2022. "Experts vs. policymakers in the COVID-19 policy response," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 22-39.
    4. Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2022. "The political economy of early COVID-19 interventions in US states," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    5. Besley, Timothy & Dray, Sacha, 2023. "The political economy of lockdown: Does free media matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    6. Ján Palguta & René Levínský & Samuel Škoda, 2022. "Do elections accelerate the COVID-19 pandemic?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 35(1), pages 197-240, January.
    7. Étienne Dagorn & Martina Dattilo & Matthieu Pourieux, 2022. "Preferences matter! Political Responses to the COVID-19 and Population’s Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2022-01, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    8. Massimo Bordignon & Federico Franzoni & Matteo Gamalerio, 2023. "Is Populism reversible? Evidence from Italian local elections during the pandemic," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def124, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    9. Nguyen, Harvey & Pham, Anh Viet & Pham, Man Duy (Marty) & Pham, Mia Hang, 2023. "Business resilience: Lessons from government responses to the global COVID-19 crisis," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(5).
    10. Helios Herrera & Maximilian Konradt & Guillermo Ordonez & Christoph Trebesch, 2020. "Corona Politics:The cost of mismanaging pandemics," PIER Working Paper Archive 20-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. , 2023. "The Political Consequences of Vaccines: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Eligibility Rules," Working Papers 953, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    12. Guilhem Cassan & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "The impact of 2020 French municipal elections on the spread of COVID-19," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 963-988, July.
    13. Chauvin, Juan Pablo & Tricaud, Clemence, 2022. "Gender and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Crisis Response," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12411, Inter-American Development Bank.
    14. Ján Palguta & Levínský, René & Škoda, Samuel, 2021. "Do Elections Accelerate the COVID-19 Pandemic? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," GLO Discussion Paper Series 891, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    15. Wojciech Charemza & Svetlana Makarova & Krzysztof Rybiński, 2023. "Anti-pandemic restrictions, uncertainty and sentiment in seven countries," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-27, February.
    16. Daryna Grechyna, 2023. "Elections and Policies: Evidence from the Covid Pandemic," CESifo Working Paper Series 10544, CESifo.
    17. De Simone Elina & Mourao Paulo Reis, 2021. "What determines governments’ response time to COVID-19? A cross-country inquiry on the measure restricting internal movements," Open Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 106-117, January.
    18. Chen, Qianmiao & Huang, Qingyang & Liu, Chang & Wang, Peng, 2022. "Career incentives of local leaders and crisis response: A case study of COVID-19 lockdowns in China," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    19. Lorena G Barberia & Maria Leticia Claro Oliveira & Andrea Junqueira & Natália de Paula Moreira & Guy D. Whitten, 2021. "Should I stay or should I go? Embracing causal heterogeneity in the study of pandemic policy and citizen behavior," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2055-2069, September.
    20. Bessho, S., 2023. "Elections and COVID-19 benefit payments," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    21. Cipullo, Davide & Le Moglie, Marco, 2022. "To vote, or not to vote? Electoral campaigns and the spread of COVID-19," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    22. Savu, Alexandru, 2022. "News shocks at the local level: Evidence from a conditional Covid-19 containment measure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    23. Medeiros, Mike & Nai, Alessandro & Erman, Ayşegül & Young, Elizabeth, 2022. "Personality traits of world leaders and differential policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 311(C).
    24. Glenn L. Furton, 2023. "The pox of politics: Troesken’s tradeoff reexamined," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 169-191, April.
    25. Leininger, Julia & von Schiller, Armin & Strupat, Christoph & Malerba, Daniele, 2022. "Policy responses to COVID-19: Why social cohesion and social protection matter in Africa," IDOS Discussion Papers 20/2022, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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