Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment
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- Gharad Bryan & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2015. "Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 174-204, August.
- Bryan, Gharad & Karlan, Dean & Zinman, Jonathan, 2015. "Referrals: peer screening and enforcement in a consumer credit field experiment," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 59009, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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- repec:bla:rdevec:v:21:y:2017:i:4:p:e67-e87 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:101:y:2018:i:c:p:230-249 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2012-03-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MFD-2012-03-08 (Microfinance)
- NEP-SOC-2012-03-08 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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