Liquidity Needs in Economies with Interconnected Financial Obligations
A model is developed where firms in a financial system have to settle their debts to each other by using a liquid asset. The question that is studied is how many firms must obtain how much of this asset from outside the financial system to make sure that all debts within the system are settled. The main result is that these liquidity needs are larger when these firms are more interconnected through their debts, i.e. when they borrow from and lend to more firms. Two pecuniary externalities are discussed. One involves the choice of paying one creditor first rather than another. The second involves the extent to which firms borrow and acquire claims on other firms with the proceeds. When a group of firms raises their involvement in this activity, firms outside the group may face more difficulties in settling their debts.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Rotemberg, Julio J. "Minimal Settlement Assets in Economies with Interconnected Financial Obligations." Journal of Money, Credit & Banking 43, no. 1 (February 2011): 81–108.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
- Nier, Erlend & Yang, Jing & Yorulmazer, Tanju & Alentorn, Amadeo, 2008.
"Network models and financial stability,"
Bank of England working papers
346, Bank of England.
- Angelini, Paolo, 1998. "An analysis of competitive externalities in gross settlement systems," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno M & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2000.
"Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 611-38, August.
- Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Systemic risk, interbank relations, and liquidity provision by the central bank," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 611-640.
- X. Freixas & B. Parigi & J-C. Rochet, 2000. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by theCentral Bank," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 47, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 2325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi & Jean Charles Rochet, 1998. "Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank," Economics Working Papers 440, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
- Stacy Panigay Coleman, 2002. "The evolution of the Federal Reserve's intraday credit policies," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Feb, pages 67-84.
- Larry Eisenberg & Thomas H. Noe, 2001. "Systemic Risk in Financial Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(2), pages 236-249, February.
- David L. Mengle, 1985. "Daylight overdrafts and payments system risks," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue May, pages 14-27.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Bech, Morten L. & Soramäki, Kimmo, 2001. "Gridlock resolution in interbank payment systems," Research Discussion Papers 9/2001, Bank of Finland.
- Antoine Martin, 2005. "Recent evolution of large-value payment systems : balancing liquidity and risk," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 33-57.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14222. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.