IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Farsight and Myopia in a Transboundary Pollution Game

  • Hassan Benchekroun
  • Guiomar Martín-Herrán

We study the impact of farsightedness in a transboundary pollution game; i.e. the ability of a country to forecast the relationship between current emissions and future levels of pollution and thus on future damages. We show that when all countries are farsighted their payo s are larger than when all countries are myopic. However in the case where one myopic country becomes farsighted we show that the welfare impact of farsightedness on that country is ambiguous. Farsightedness may be welfare reducing for the country that acquires it. This is due to the reaction of the other farsighted countries to that country's acquisition of farsight. The country that acquires farsight reduces its emissions while the other farsighted countries extend their emissions. The overall impact on total emissions is ambiguous.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/06-2012-cah.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 06-2012.

as
in new window

Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2012
Contact details of provider: Postal: C.P. 6128, Succ. centre-ville, Montréal (PQ) H3C 3J7
Phone: (514) 343-6557
Fax: (514) 343-7221
Web page: http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bruce Robinson & Chet Lakhani, 1975. "Dynamic Price Models for New-Product Planning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(10), pages 1113-1122, June.
  2. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-64, September.
  3. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
  4. Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January.
  5. Benchekroun, Hassan & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Taboubi, Sihem, 2009. "Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 1699-1718, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sharon BREWER)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.