Bureaucratic Corruption As a Constraint on Voter Choice
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- Leonard Dudley & Claude Montmarquette, 1987. "Bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 127-160, September.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Bureaucracy and Corruption Taxation Proof," MPRA Paper 17177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ventelou, Bruno, 2001. "Équilibres et stabilité de la corruption dans un modèle de croissance : l’effet de la rémunération des politiciens," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(3), pages 339-356, septembre.
- Marco Pani, 2011. "Hold your nose and vote: corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 163-196, July.
- Jean Cartier-Bresson, 1992. "Éléments d'analyse pour une économie de la corruption," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(131), pages 581-609.
- Marco Pani, 2009. "Hold Your Nose and Vote; Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 09/83, International Monetary Fund.
- Lawrence Kenny & Stanley Winer, 2006. "Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(2), pages 181-215, May.
- Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Informal Sector and Taxation," MPRA Paper 17129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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KeywordsBureaucracy ; Corruion ; Asymmetry ; Informa Tion ; Fiscal Policy;
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