Bureaucratic Corruption As a Constraint on Voter Choice
It Has Often Been Assumed That a Country's Tax Level, Tax Structure Progressivity and After-Tax Income Distribution Are Chosen by Voters Subject Only to Their Budget Constraints. This Paper Argues That At Certain Income Levels Voters' Decisions May Be Constrained by Bureaucratic Corruption. the Theoretical Arguments Are Developed in Asymmetry Limits the Capacity of the Fiscal System to Generate Revenues by Means of Direct Taxes. This Hypothesis Is Tested Witha Sample of International Data by Means of a Simultaneous Equation Model. the Distortions Resulting From Corruption Ar Captured Through Their Effects on a Latent Variable Defined As the Overall Fiscal Structure. Evidence Is Found of Causality Running From This Latent Variable to the Level of Taxes and the Degree of After Tax Inequality.
|Date of creation:||1986|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, Québec, H3C 3J7|
Phone: (514) 343-6540
Fax: (514) 343-5831
Web page: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Montmarquette, Claude, 1974.
"A Note on Income (Labor) Inequality: Income Tax Systems and Human Capital Theory,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 620-625, May/June.
- Montmarquette, C., 1972. "A Note on Income (Labor) Inequality, Income Tax Systems and Human Capital Theory," Cahiers de recherche 7202, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley L, 1988. "Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 701-712, September.
- Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
- Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 209-287, October.
- Sam Peltzman, 1980. "The Growth of Government," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 1, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- James Kau & Paul Rubin, 1981. "The size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 261-274, January.
- Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley, 1984. "A positive model of tax structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 67-87, June.
- Schmidt, Robert M, 1983. "Who Maximizes What? A Study in Student Time Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 23-28, May.
- Romer, Thomas, 1975. "Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 163-185, February.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8635. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sharon BREWER)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.