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Partisan Alignment, Insurgency and Security: Evidence from the Indian Red-corridor

Author

Listed:
  • Ashani Amarasinghe

    (School of Economics, University of Sydney and and SoDa Laboratories, Monash University;)

  • Pushkar Maitra

    (Department of Economics, Monash University)

  • Yuchen Zhong

    (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economics and Social Research, University of Melbourne)

Abstract

Better economic outcomes can prevail when governments at different levels of hierarchy are politically aligned. This often happens because upper level governments are more willing to transfer resources to, and invest in public goods in, aligned constituencies. In this paper we examine whether such political alignment causally affects security. We consider the case of the Naxalite insurgency in India, an issue of significant public safety and security. We focus on close elections and use a regression discontinuity (RD) design, which allows us to examine the causal impact of electing an aligned candidate on security. Our RD estimates show that the election of an aligned candidate leads to a significant reduction in violence. Examining the role of local natural resource activity, i.e., mining, as an underlying mechanism, we find that this negative effect is driven by constituencies close to mining areas. These findings confirm the relevance of political alignment in delivering security within constituencies, and the potential role played by local mining activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashani Amarasinghe & Pushkar Maitra & Yuchen Zhong, 2023. "Partisan Alignment, Insurgency and Security: Evidence from the Indian Red-corridor," Monash Economics Working Papers 2023-22, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2023-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2008. "The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2302-2319, December.
    2. Yogesh Uppal, 2009. "The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 9-27, January.
    3. Singhal, Saurabh & Nilakantan, Rahul, 2016. "The economic effects of a counterinsurgency policy in India: A synthetic control analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-17.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political alignment; Naxalite insurgency; security; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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