Quantal Response Equilibrium with Non-Monotone Probabilities: A Dynamic Approach
Abstract In this paper I will give an example of a population game and of a locally improving stochastic learning process such that the quantal response equilibrium assigns to the different strategies the probabilities that are non-monotone in the payoffs. Moreover, if the initial state probabilities are payoff-monotone, then the learning can be shown the shrink mistakes in one direction and exacerbate them in the other direction.
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