The Transparency Trap: Quality of Public Information and the Intensity of Revolutionary Violence

This paper develops a theoretical framework to study how the quality of public information shapes the intensity of revolt in global games of regime change. Building on the canonical literature, I model citizens deciding whether to attack a regime where intensity determines both effectiveness and failure costs. I extend the framework by endogenizing total conflict intensity through the strategic interaction of vanguard groups seeking to maximize the potential of the attack, and including the regime’s response. The analysis reveals a non-monotonic †transparency trap†: at intermediate beliefs, the relationship between information quality and total violence becomes Ushaped. Intensity is high when information is scarce (serving as a substitute coordination device), minimizes at intermediate levels, and surges again when high transparency facilitates violent coordination. These dynamics persist when intensity is the outcome of decentralized strategic choice. Moreover, as the number of competing vanguard groups increases, so does the equilibrium intensity. I empirically test these predictions drawing 177 events from the Revolutionary Episodes dataset (1900–2014), combined with historical Freedom of Expression indices. The results provide robust support for the U-shaped hypothesis and confirm that higher vanguard competition structurally escalates conflict. These findings highlight that transparency reforms can have counterintuitive effects, providing relevant policy implications.