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Corruption and production: a policy analysis

  • Raffaella Coppier

    (University of Macerata)

  • Elisabetta Michetti

    (University of Macerata)

Registered author(s):

    � This paper analyzes the relation existing between corruption, monitoring and output in an economy. By solving a dynamic game we prove that equilibrium output is a non-linear upper-hemicontinuous function (MP function) of the monitoring level implemented by the State on corruption, presenting 3 different equilibrium scenarios. According to our model, we analyze the optimal strategy depending on the policy objective of the State and we prove that if the State is budget constrained the optimal policy can lead the economy to an equilibrium with widespread corruption and maximum production.

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    File URL: http://www.unimc.it/dief/wpaper/wpaper00022/filePaper
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    Paper provided by Macerata University, Department of Finance and Economic Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 22-2004.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2004
    Date of revision: Oct 2008
    Publication status: Published in Economic Modelling, Vol. 23, N. 4 pp 622-637
    Handle: RePEc:mcr:wpdief:wpaper00022
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Via Crescimbeni, 20 -62100 Macerata
    Phone: 0733.258.201
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    Web page: http://www.unimc.it/dief
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    1. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
    2. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Working papers 96-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
    4. Del Monte, Alfredo & Papagni, Erasmo, 2001. "Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: the case of Italy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-16, March.
    5. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
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