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Spectrum Management and Regulation: Towards a Full-Fledged Market for Spectrum Bands?

Author

Listed:
  • Fulvio Minervini

    (not available)

  • Diego Piacentino

    (Università di Macerata)

Abstract

The increase in spectrum demand, which has occurred internationally in the last 10-15 years as a consequence of booming wireless communications, has placed considerable pressure on traditional regulatory arrangements for spectrum access and use. Regulators, especially in industrial countries, have taken a number of steps of remedial policy vis-`a-vis these difficulties, by increasing the share of spectrum made available for commercial use as well as by injecting some flexibility into command-and-control regulation. These are, however, steps of a temporary, palliative nature and do not make for a wider spectrum management reform. Starting from a discussion of the limitations of command-and-control regulation, this paper deals with the two main, alternative approaches which have been proposed: a (Coasian) market regime, and a commons regime. After taking sides in favour of the market regime, consideration is given to some implementation issues, and to a regulatory formula—called administrative incentive pricing—which could help ensure a smooth transition from command-and-control to market arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Fulvio Minervini & Diego Piacentino, 2007. "Spectrum Management and Regulation: Towards a Full-Fledged Market for Spectrum Bands?," Working Papers 07-2007, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Nov 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcr:wpaper:wpaper00007
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Spectrum management; Telecommunications policy; Administrative incentive pricing; Market mechanisms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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