Preferential Treatment in College Admissions and Student Incentives
This paper examines student incentives when faced with a college admissions policy which pursues student body diversity. The effect of a diversify-conscious admissions policy critically depends on the design of the policy. If the admissions policy fails to incentivize students from a disadvantaged socioeconomic background it may lead to a deterioration in the intergroup score gap while failing to improve student body diversity in equilibrium.
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- Roland Fryer & Glenn C. Loury & Tolga Yuret, 2003.
"Color-Blind Affirmative Action,"
NBER Working Papers
10103, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roland G. Freyer, Jr. & Glenn C. Loury & Tolga Yuret, 2003. "Color Blind Affirmative Action," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-131, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Qiang Fu, 2006. "A Theory of Affirmative Action in College Admissions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(3), pages 420-428, July.
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