IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lmu/muenec/30956.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Entitlements and Obligations

Author

Listed:
  • Schlicht, Ekkehart

Abstract

This is an electronic reprint of the second chapter of the book "On Custom in the Economy" by Ekkehart Schlicht that has been published in 1998 by the Clarendon Press, Oxford. The chapter focusses on the behavioral entailments of concluding a contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1995. "Entitlements and Obligations," Discussion Papers in Economics 30956, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:30956
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30956/1/Schlicht_2016_Entitlements.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-741, September.
    2. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    5. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    6. Casson, Mark, 1991. "The Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Performance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283751.
    7. Bull, Clive, 1983. "Implicit Contracts in the Absence of Enforcement and Risk Aversion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 658-671, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Roland Helm & Martin Kloyer & Christin Aust, 2018. "R&D Collaboration Between Firms: Hard And Soft Antecedents Of Supplier Knowledge Sharing," International Journal of Innovation Management (ijim), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 24(01), pages 1-42, December.
    3. Glenn Parker, 2005. "Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 333-354, March.
    4. Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck, 2017. "Governance and Stakeholders," NBER Working Papers 23460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Todorova, Tamara, 2022. "Оливър Уилямсън: Новатор На 20 Век И Основател На Новата Институционална Икономика [Oliver Williamson: an innovator of the 20th century and founder of the new institutional economics]," MPRA Paper 121077, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Lechosław Rojewski, 2008. "Contracting and Transaction Costs in the Public-Private Partnership. A Conception in the Light of the New Institutional Economy," Ekonomia journal, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, vol. 21.
    7. Baarda, James R., 2003. "Current Law & Economics Debates: Tools for Assessing Fundamental Cooperative Changes?," 2003 Annual Meeting, October 29 31802, NCERA-194 Research on Cooperatives.
    8. Cécile Cézanne, 2012. "Berle and Means," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Ariño, Africa & Reuer, Jeffrey J., 2004. "Alliance contractual design," IESE Research Papers D/572, IESE Business School.
    10. Robison, Lindon J. & Hanson, Steven D., 1995. "Social Capital and Economic Cooperation," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 43-58, July.
    11. John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(3), pages 482-493.
    12. Kim, Sukkoo, 1999. "The Rise of Multiunit Firms in U.S. Manufacturing," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 360-386, October.
    13. Hugh-Jones, David & Ooi, Jinnie, 2023. "Where do fairness preferences come from? Norm transmission in a teen friendship network," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    14. Elizabeth J. Altman & Frank Nagle & Michael L. Tushman, 2013. "Innovating Without Information Constraints: Organizations, Communities, and Innovation When Information Costs Approach Zero," Harvard Business School Working Papers 14-043, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2014.
    15. M. Meuleman & S. Manigart & A. Lockett & M. Wright, 2006. "Transaction costs, behavioral uncertainty and the formation of interfirm cooperations: Syndication in the UK private equity market," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 06/359, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    16. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:483-506 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Thieme, Lutz & Winkelhake, Olaf & Hartmann, Ulrich, 2014. "Fairness als universelle Norm? Empirische Evidenz ohne Manna [Fairness as a universal norm? Empiric evidence without manna]," Working Papers of the European Institute for Socioeconomics 12, European Institute for Socioeconomics (EIS), Saarbrücken.
    18. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    19. Haider A. Khan, 2004. "General Conclusions: From Crisis to a Global Political Economy of Freedom," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Global Markets and Financial Crises in Asia, chapter 9, pages 193-211, Palgrave Macmillan.
    20. Heugens, P.P.M.A.R. & Kaptein, S.P. & van Oosterhout, J., 2007. "Contracts to Communities: A Processual Model of Organizational Virtue," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2007-023-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    21. Andreas Leibbrandt, 2016. "Behavioral Constraints on Pricing: Experimental Evidence on Price Discrimination and Customer Antagonism," CESifo Working Paper Series 6214, CESifo.
    22. Ni Du & Qinglan Han, 2018. "Pricing and Service Quality Guarantee Decisions in Logistics Service Supply Chain with Fairness Concern," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 35(05), pages 1-41, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords: entitlements; obligations; contracting; norms; behavioral economics; self-enforcing contracts non-enforcable contracts; norms; moralistic aggression;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:30956. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tamilla Benkelberg (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.