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Le Currency Board : les contraintes de financement et d'ajustement de la convertibilité intégrale

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  • PONSOT, Jean-François

    (LATEC - CNRS - Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

La communication a pour objet l'évaluation des trajectoires suivies par les économies qui ont adopté récemment un régime de Currency Board. Après avoir identifié les motivations de ce choix et différencié les contextes de mise en application de cet arrangement monétaire institutionnel singulier, les implications de ce dernier sur le système financier et l'économie réelle sont mises en lumière. Outre une contrainte de liquidité exacerbée qu'elle fait peser sur le système bancaire confronté à l'absence de prêteur en dernier ressort, l'automaticité de l'émission de monnaie centrale limite tout activisme budgétaire. Les règles du Currency Board rétablissent certes la stabilité monétaire ; mais dans un contexte où les marchés nationaux de capitaux restent peu développés, elles instaurent les bases d'une croissance fragile, en rendant la dynamique de financement de la production largement tributaire de la capacité de l'économie nationale à dégager des entrées nettes de monnaie de réserve. Le cas bulgare montre que lorsque la condition n'est pas remplie, le Currency Board tend à conduire à la stagnation. Dans le cas contraire, le taux de croissance peut être élevé et accélérer le processus " d'émergence " ou de " rattrapage ", mais le régime de croissance révèle une instabilité chronique. L'ajustement par le taux de change étant rendu caduc par la relation de parité fixe, et l'action de l'autorité monétaire sur les taux d'intérêt étant exclue, les entreprises et le marché du travail doivent absorber les chocs exogènes dans leur totalité : la stabilité monétaire qu'impose le Currency Board nécessite la flexibilité de l'économie réelle. Les exemples argentin et estonien, qui mêlent à la fois croissance (instable) et chômage élevé, montre que dans un environnement international marqué par l'instabilité, les coûts de cet ajustement peuvent devenir élevés. Pour limiter leurs effets, certains ont cherché développer des formes originales de prêt en dernier ressort et à réintroduire une certaine dose de pouvoir discrétionnaire, quitte à dénaturer les règles de l'arrangement monétaire et à remettre en question l'effet-crédibilité qu'il est censé apporter. / The paper scrutinizes the consequences of the adoption of a currency board arrangement (CBA) by some emerging economies during the 1990s. Considering the justifications of this choice and the different setting-up contexts, it focuses on the implications of a CBA on the financial system and the real economy. A high degree of liquidity of the banking system is required in the absence of a lender-of-last-resort, and the automatic money supply process strictly disciplines the fiscal policy. Monetary stability is restored; but in most of these economies where capital markets are underdeveloped, CBA's rules make the domestic credit supply dependent on the ability of the economy to maintain over the time net flows of the reserve currency, and so set up a precarious growth dynamics. When it is not so (Bulgaria), CBA brings about stagnation. When this is the case, the growth rate can be high but not regular in the medium term. Indeed CBA prevents the use of an exchange rate change and precludes the active use of monetary policy (interest rates setting) to stabilize the domestic economy. So, the adjustment rests on the ability of the real sector and of the labour market to absorb exogenous shocks. High unemployment persistence in Argentina and in Estonia shows that the process can be costly and painful. To limit these negative effects, some forms of lender-of-last-resort functions and discretionary power are sometimes established, but these new arrangements alter currency board principles and weaken the monetary credibility

Suggested Citation

  • PONSOT, Jean-François, 2000. "Le Currency Board : les contraintes de financement et d'ajustement de la convertibilité intégrale," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2000-10, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
  • Handle: RePEc:lat:lateco:2000-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
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    5. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Lionel Fontagné & Amina Lahrèche-Revil, 1999. "Exchange Rate Strategies in the Competition for Attracting FDI," Working Papers 1999-16, CEPII research center.
    6. K. Hristov & Nikolay Nenovsky, 1999. "Monetary Policy under the Currency Board: the case of Bulgaria," Post-Print halshs-00260107, HAL.
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    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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    Keywords

    caisse d'émission; banque centrale; offre de monnaie; base monétaire; politique monétaire; taux de change; contrainte d'ajustement; économies émergentes ; currency board ; central bank ; supply of money and credit ; base money ; monetary policy ; foreign exchange rate ; adjustment constraint ; emerging economies;

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies

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