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Investissement et financement dans un monopole avec bénéfices privés

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  • Jacques Thépot

    () (LaRGE Research Center, Université de Strasbourg)

Abstract

Cet article étudie l'impact de bénéfices privés sur la stratégie d'investissement et de financement d'une entreprise en situation de monopole. A l'origine actionnaire à 100%, son dirigeant doit décider la part du capital qu'il cède à un investisseur extérieur et/ou l'emprunt qu'il contracte pour financer un investissement en capacité. Nous étudions ici comment se combinent ces deux sources de financement lorsque le dirigeant prélève un bénéfice privé qui renchérit le coût de production. Nous montrons que l'emprunt devient indirectement une source privilégiée de financement de ces bénéfices privés.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacques Thépot, 2013. "Investissement et financement dans un monopole avec bénéfices privés," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2013-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2013-02
    as

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    File URL: http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2013/2013-02.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thépot, Jacques & Netzer, Jean-Luc, 2008. "On the optimality of the full-cost pricing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 282-292, October.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    3. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Brisley, Neil & Bris, Arturo & Cabolis, Christos, 2011. "A theory of optimal expropriation, mergers and industry competition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 955-965, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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