Increased Regressivity of the Optimal Capital Tax under a Welfare Constraint for Newborn Children
In this paper, we develop a three-period model that incorporates parents' heterogeneous skills and a welfare constraint for newborn children. Our numerical analysis shows how the optimal tax system is affected by the weight attached to the newborn child by a social planner. The main finding is that an increase in the guaranteed welfare level for newborn children makes the optimal capital income tax rate more regressive. This result is closely related to the trade-off between incentives for parents and insurance for the newborn child.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
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