IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/0508.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Price Volatility and Banking in Green Certificate Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Eirik S. Amundsen

    (Department of Economics, University of Bergen)

  • Fridrik M. Baldursson

    (Department of Economics, University of Iceland)

  • Jørgen Birk Mortensen

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

There is concern that prices in a market for Green Certificates (GCs) primarily based on volatile wind power will fluctuate excessively, leading to corresponding volatility of electricity prices. Applying a rational expectations simulation model of competitive storage and speculation of GCs the paper shows that the introduction of banking of GCs may reduce price volatility considerably and lead to increased social surplus. Banking lowers average prices and is therefore not necessarily to the benefit of “green producers”. Proposed price bounds on GC-prices will reduce the importance of banking and even of the GC system itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Eirik S. Amundsen & Fridrik M. Baldursson & Jørgen Birk Mortensen, 2005. "Price Volatility and Banking in Green Certificate Markets," Discussion Papers 05-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0508
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2005/0508.pdf/
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fristrup, Peter, 2003. "Some challenges related to introducing tradable green certificates," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 15-19, January.
    2. Williams,Jeffrey C. & Wright,Brian D., 2005. "Storage and Commodity Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521023399, May.
    3. Brian D. Wright & Jeffrey C. Williams, 1984. "The Welfare Effects of the Introduction of Storage," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 169-192.
    4. Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 101-115, April.
    5. Yates, Andrew J. & Cronshaw, Mark B., 2001. "Pollution Permit Markets with Intertemporal Trading and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 104-118, July.
    6. Jensen, S. G. & Skytte, K., 2002. "Interactions between the power and green certificate markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 425-435, April.
    7. Cronshaw, Mark B & Brown-Kruse, Jamie, 1996. "Regulated Firms in Pollution Permit Markets with Banking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 179-189, March.
    8. Deaton, Angus & Laroque, Guy, 1996. "Competitive Storage and Commodity Price Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 896-923, October.
    9. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Mortensen, Jorgen Birk, 2001. "The Danish Green Certificate System: some simple analytical results," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 489-509, September.
    10. Rubin, Jonathan D., 1996. "A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 269-286, November.
    11. Spulber, Daniel F., 1985. "Effluent regulation and long-run optimality," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-116, June.
    12. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    electricity; environment; commodity speculation; green certificates; marketable permits; uncertainty;

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0508. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/okokudk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.