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Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly

Author

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  • Per Baltzer Overgaard

    (University of Aarhus)

  • Peter Møllgaard

    (Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

In the economics literature, various views on the likely (efficiency) effects of information exchange, communication between firms and market transparency present themselves. Often these views on information flows are highly conflicting. On the one hand, it is argued that increased information dissemination improves firm planning to the benefit of society (including customers) and/or allows potential customers to make the right decisions given their preferences. On the other hand, the literature also suggests that increased information dissemination can have significant coordinating or collusive potential to the benefit of firms but at the expense of society at large (mainly, potential customers). In this chapter, we try to make sense of these views, with the aim of presenting some simple lessons for antitrust practice. In addition, the chapter presents some cases, from both sides of the Atlantic, where informational issues have played a significant role.

Suggested Citation

  • Per Baltzer Overgaard & Peter Møllgaard, 2005. "Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:2005-11
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/dp/dp_2003-2006/2005-11.pdf/
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    Cited by:

    1. Rasch, Alexander & Herre, Jesko, 2013. "Customer-side transparency, elastic demand, and tacit collusion under differentiation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 51-59.
    2. Ireland, Norman & Waterson, Michael, 2006. "Cartels and Search," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 770, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Zhang, Xubing & Jiang, Bo, 2014. "Increasing Price Transparency: Implications of Consumer Price Posting for Consumers' Haggling Behavior and a Seller's Pricing Strategies," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 68-85.
    4. Wilson, Chris, 2006. "Markets with Search and Switching Costs," MPRA Paper 131, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Oct 2006.
    5. Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr, 2013. "Transparency in Electricity Markets," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    6. Anne Margarian, 2013. "A Constructive Critique of the Endogenous Development Approach in the European Support of Rural Areas," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 1-29, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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