Fiscal Decentralization, Redistribution and Growth
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of a transfer mechanism in a fiscally decentralized economy where local governments select their tax collection effort to maximize their lifetime utility. We consider a transfer rule that both punishes for the lack of efficiency in tax-collection and compensates for the deviation of pre-tax or transfer income from a target level; in addition, a portion of transfers is considered to be directed towards investment. Simulations of the model’s optimal solution reveal that increasing punishment always results in increased steady state effort, despite the disincentives that increasing income compensation or directed investment may generate. Increasing punishment also improves capital accumulation the lower the rate of directed investments and the lower the tax rate. Further, efficiency in tax collection is achieved the lower the rate of directed investment and the higher the punishment rate.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sarıyer, 34450 İstanbul|
Web page: http://erf.ku.edu.tr
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jorge Martínez Vázquez & Robert M. McNab, 2006.
"Fiscal decentralization, macrostability and growth,"
Hacienda Pública Española,
IEF, vol. 179(4), pages 25-49, September.
- Jorge Martínez-Vázquez & Robert M. McNab, "undated". "Fiscal Decentralization, Macrostability And Growth," Working Papers 11-03 Classification-JEL , Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
- Luiz R. De Mello Jr., 2004. "Can Fiscal Decentralization Strengthen Social Capital?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 32(1), pages 4-35, January.
- International Monetary Fund, 2000. "Can Fiscal Decentralization Strengthen Social Capital?," IMF Working Papers 00/129, International Monetary Fund.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:koc:wpaper:1114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sumru Oz)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.