Peer Pressure in Multi-Dimensional Work Tasks
We study the influence of peer pressure in multi-dimensional work tasks theoretically and in a controlled laboratory experiment. Thereby, workers face peer pressure in only one work dimension. We find that effort provision increases in the dimension where peer pressure is introduced. However, not all of this increase translates into a productivity gain, since the effect is partly offset by a decrease of effort in the work dimension without peer pressure. Furthermore, this tradeoff is stronger for workers who run behind in the dimension of peer pressure. Finally, we analyze the optimal group composition to harness peer pressure. Effort in the dimension of peer pressure and overall productivity seem to be unaffected by group composition, but the effort reduction in the dimension that is not subject to peer pressure is stronger when workers’ skills are highly diverse. Hence, it seems like optimal group composition depends on work environment. While existing literature recommends maximizing worker-groups’ skill diversity in one-dimensional work tasks, our results suggest to mix similar workers in multi-dimensional tasks.
|Date of creation:||15 Nov 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 0221 / 470 5607
Fax: 0221 / 470 5179
Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1999.
"Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,"
NBER Working Papers
6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January.
- Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce, 1996.
"Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records,"
Cahiers de recherche
9623, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Paarsch, Harry J & Shearer, Bruce, 2000. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 59-92, February.
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 1996. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-31, CIRANO.
- Paarsch, H-J & Shearer, B, 1996. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects : Statistical Evidence From Payroll Records," Papers 9623, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2001.
"Peer Effects With Random Assignment: Results For Dartmouth Roommates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 681-704, May.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2000. "Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates," NBER Working Papers 7469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2010.
"Social Incentives in the Workplace,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 417-458.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kls:series:0057. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Werner)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.