Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution Revisited: Rules, Morality, and the Sensory Order
One of the most controversial parts of F. A. Hayek's work is his theory of cultural evolution. By starting with current discussions on biological and cultural selection theories we bring individual, kin and group selection aspects together and shed some light on Hayek's thoughts on the Theory of Mind. We find that these thoughts traced out from his work on the "Sensory Order", need to be combined with his thoughts on cultural evolution. Both works can be backed by kin selection arguments and extended by a theory of cultural learning in which individual selection plays an important role. In doing so, we offer a more integrated view on Hayek's theory of cultural selection with respect to moral rules and collective choice processes in societies.
|Date of creation:||20 May 2000|
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