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Using Cognitive Dissonance to Manipulate Social Preferences

Author

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  • Oxoby, Robert J.

    (University of Calgary)

  • Smith, Alexander Apt

    (United States Military Academy)

Abstract

We explore the role of cognitive dissonance in dictator and public goods games. Specifically, we motivate cognitive dissonance between one's perception of “fair treatment” and self-interested behaviour by having participants answer a question about fairness. Utilizing two manipulations (reminding participants about their answer to the fairness question and publicly reporting aggregate answers to the question), we find that there is greater cognitive dissonance and behavioural change when there is a social component (i.e., reporting of aggregate answers). When a participant's answer to the fairness question is private, there is less dissonance and hence no behavioural change.

Suggested Citation

  • Oxoby, Robert J. & Smith, Alexander Apt, 2014. "Using Cognitive Dissonance to Manipulate Social Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 8310, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8310
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    15. repec:cdl:ucsbec:qt0127h86v is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin & Montinari, Natalia & Panganiban, Marian & Ploner, Matteo & Werner, Benedikt, 2018. "On the malleability of fairness ideals: Spillover effects in partial and impartial allocation tasks," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 60-74.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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