IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp3868.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Measuring Unemployment Insurance Generosity

Author

Listed:
  • Pallage, Stéphane

    (University of Québec at Montréal)

  • Scruggs, Lyle

    (University of Connecticut)

  • Zimmermann, Christian

    (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a methodology to summarize the various policy parameters of an unemployment insurance scheme into a single generosity parameter. Unemployment insurance policies are multdimensional objects. They are typically defined by waiting periods, eligibility duration, benefit levels and asset tests when eligible, which makes intertemporal or international comparisons difficult. To make things worse, labor market conditions, such as the likelihood and duration of unemployment matter when assessing the generosity of different policies. We build a first model with such complex characteristics. Our model features heterogeneous agents that are liquidity constrained but can self-insure. We then build a second model that is similar, except that the unemployment insurance is simpler: it is deprived of waiting periods and agents are eligible forever with constant benefits. We then determine which level of benefits in this second model makes agents indifferent between both unemployment insurance policies. We apply this strategy to the unemployment insurance program of the United Kingdom and study how its generosity evolved over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Pallage, Stéphane & Scruggs, Lyle & Zimmermann, Christian, 2008. "Measuring Unemployment Insurance Generosity," IZA Discussion Papers 3868, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3868
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp3868.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juan C. Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "The Regulation of Labor," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382.
    2. Pallage, Stephane & Zimmermann, Christian, 2001. "Voting on Unemployment Insurance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 903-923, November.
    3. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1998. "The European Unemployment Dilemma," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 514-550, June.
    4. Heckman James J., 2007. "Comments on Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence by David Howell, Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn, and John Schmitt," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-5, August.
    5. Hansen, Gary D & Imrohoroglu, Ayse, 1992. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 118-142, February.
    6. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
    7. Howell David R. & Baker Dean & Glyn Andrew & Schmitt John, 2007. "Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-73, May.
    8. Pallage, Stephane & Zimmermann, Christian, 2005. "Heterogeneous labor markets and generosity towards the unemployed: an international perspective," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 88-106, March.
    9. Marcus Hagedorn & Iourii Manovskii, 2008. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1692-1706, September.
    10. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-1362, December.
    11. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Razin, Assaf & Tesar, Linda L., 1994. "Effective tax rates in macroeconomics: Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 297-323, December.
    12. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March.
    13. James P. Allan & Lyle Scruggs, 2004. "Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 496-512, July.
    14. Lyle Scruggs, 2006. "The Generosity of Social Insurance, 1971--2002," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 22(3), pages 349-364, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabre, Alice & Pallage, Stéphane, 2015. "Child labor, idiosyncratic shocks, and social policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 394-411.
    2. David R. Howell & Miriam Rehm, 2009. "Unemployment compensation and high European unemployment: a reassessment with new benefit indicators," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 25(1), pages 60-93, Spring.
    3. Samia BENALLAH & Carole BONNET & Claire El MOUDDEN & Antoine MATH, 2012. "Comment Mesurer La "Générosité" Des Systèmes De Retraite ? Une Application Aux Pays De La Méditerranée," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 35, pages 215-234.
    4. Pollak, Andreas, 2013. "Employment Insurance and the Business Cycle," MPRA Paper 49358, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Stéphane Pallage & Lyle Scruggs & Christian Zimmermann, 2009. "Unemployment Insurance Generosity: A Transatlantic Comparison," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 95-96, pages 15-23.
    6. Amine Samir, 2016. "The Canadian Unemployment Insurance Generosity: Reflections from a Comparative Analysis," Comparative Economic Research, Sciendo, vol. 19(3), pages 133-145, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rogerson, Richard & Shimer, Robert, 2011. "Search in Macroeconomic Models of the Labor Market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 7, pages Pages: 61, Elsevier.
    2. Fabre, Alice & Pallage, Stéphane, 2015. "Child labor, idiosyncratic shocks, and social policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 394-411.
    3. Mukoyama, Toshihiko, 2013. "Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance policy in general equilibrium," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 38(PB), pages 347-368.
    4. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1998. "Equilibrium unemployment insurance," Economics Working Papers 605, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 1999.
    5. Serdar Birinci & Kurt Gerrard See, 2018. "How Should Unemployment Insurance vary over the Business Cycle?," 2018 Meeting Papers 69, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-41, June.
    7. Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999. "Assurance chômage et sociétés," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9904, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    8. Young, Eric R., 2004. "Unemployment insurance and capital accumulation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1683-1710, November.
    9. Pollak, Andreas, 2007. "Optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 2029-2053, November.
    10. Tom Krebs & Martin Scheffel, 2013. "Macroeconomic Evaluation of Labor Market Reform in Germany," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 61(4), pages 664-701, December.
    11. David Andolfatto, 2007. "Search Models of Unemployment," Discussion Papers dp07-01, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    12. Andreas Pollak, 2008. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(4), pages 696-726, December.
    13. Nicola Pavoni & G. L. Violante, 2007. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318.
    14. Robert Shimer & Ivan Werning, 2008. "Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1922-1942, December.
    15. Alice Fabre & Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 2014. "Universal Basic Income versus Unemployment Insurance," Cahiers de recherche 1427, CIRPEE.
    16. Pissarides, Christopher, 2002. "Consumption and savings with unemployment risk: implications for optimal employment contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2211, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
    18. Martin Gervais & Lawrence Warren & Reza Boostani, 2022. "Optimal unemployment insurance in a directed search model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1473-1496, October.
    19. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2010. "Why Do Firms Offer ‘Employment Protection’?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(308), pages 613-636, October.
    20. Schwartz, J., 2015. "Optimal unemployment insurance: When search takes effort and money," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-17.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    labor market policy evaluation; unemployment insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3868. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.