More than the Money: Payoff-Irrelevant Terms in Relational Contracts
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More about this item
Keywords
contract design; relational contracts; reciprocity; trust;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2018-09-17 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2018-09-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2018-09-17 (Law & Economics)
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