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Governance and Norms as Determinants of Arming

Author

Listed:
  • Michelle R. Garfinkel

    () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Michael McBride

    () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Stergios Skaperdas

    () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

In this paper, we explore two factors that can limit arming and, more generally, the costs of enforcement within and across states: governance or the formal organizations and institutions that help define and enforce property rights, and norms, or the informal arrangements in settling potential disputes. We examine the effects of these two factors in a simple static contest model, in which two sides choose levels of arming and whether to engage in actual conflict or settle in the shadow of conflict. We show how arming critically depends on both governance and norms, and therefore how societies with potentially conflictual relations can make either high or low levels of expenditures on security without any difference in the levels of security they actually enjoy. We also explore how investments in governance can reduce arming.

Suggested Citation

  • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Governance and Norms as Determinants of Arming," Working Papers 111203, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:111203
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    File URL: https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2011-2012/garfinkel-03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael McBride & Gary Milante & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Peace and War With Endogenous State Capacity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 446-468, June.
    2. Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 1-16, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Garfinkel Michelle R. & Syropoulos Constantinos, 2018. "Rules for Dividing a Disputed Resource in the Context of the Classical Liberal Argument for Peace," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 24(1), pages 1-16, February.
    2. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2015. "Trade openness and the settlement of domestic disputes in the shadow of the future," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 191-213.
    3. Andrea Canidio & Joan-Maria Esteban, 2018. "Benevolent Mediation in the Shadow of Conflict," Working Papers 1027, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interstate and intrastate disputes; Conflict; Governance; Norms; Security;

    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General

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