IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/irs/cepswp/2012-17.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bridging Monopolies of Power: Foreign Tourism Trade Relations between Germany and Jordan and Constitutional Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • DÖRRY Sabine

Abstract

International tourism trade relations often operate ?outside? national territorialities of law. In holiday destinations without mass tourism, tour operators usually rely on local service providers to produce the tourist package tour on-site. Because tour operators are not always able to establish effective governance mechanisms with their local service providers, loss of their business ? and in the worst case bankruptcy ? can cause significant economic costs. The paper discusses the efficiency of tour operators? strategies to deal with such constitutional uncertainty and to impose ?self-enforcement?. The extensive empirical case study at hand enriches our understanding of private ordering in the service sector and thus contributes to the conceptual discussion within the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

Suggested Citation

  • DÖRRY Sabine, 2012. "Bridging Monopolies of Power: Foreign Tourism Trade Relations between Germany and Jordan and Constitutional Uncertainty," LISER Working Paper Series 2012-17, LISER.
  • Handle: RePEc:irs:cepswp:2012-17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.liser.lu/publi_viewer.cfm?tmp=2651
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Storper & Anthony J. Venables, 2004. "Buzz: face-to-face contact and the urban economy," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(4), pages 351-370, August.
    2. Bjørn, Asheim & Coenen, Lars & Vang, Jan, 2005. "Face-to-Face, Buzz and Knowledge Bases: Socio-spatial implications for learning and innovation policy," Papers in Innovation Studies 2005/18, Lund University, CIRCLE - Center for Innovation, Research and Competences in the Learning Economy.
    3. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    4. Bjørn Asheim & Lars Coenen & Jan Vang, 2007. "Face-to-face, buzz, and knowledge bases: sociospatial implications for learning, innovation, and innovation policy," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 25(5), pages 655-670, October.
    5. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December.
    6. Henrik Egbert, 2006. "Cross-border Small-scale Trading in South-Eastern Europe: Do Embeddedness and Social Capital Explain Enough?," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 346-361, June.
    7. Kronman, Anthony T, 1985. "Contract Law and the State of Nature," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 5-32, Spring.
    8. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, April.
    9. Nancy Leech & Anthony Onwuegbuzie, 2009. "A typology of mixed methods research designs," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 265-275, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International private law; transaction costs; private ordering; tourism; Jordan; Germany;

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:irs:cepswp:2012-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Library and Documentation). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cepsslu.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.