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Optimisation d’une stratégie anti-OPA par limitation linéaire des droits de vote face à un investisseur hostile

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  • Bruno-Laurent Moschetto
  • Frédéric Teulon

Abstract

This paper studies the rules that limit voting rights as a defensive measure against hostile takeovers. We consider atomistic shareholders and a small group of united minority shareholders, the hard core, that wants to block any hostile takeovers. This group constructs a device based on a threshold below which each share is linked to one vote and above which each share gives less than one vote, according to a coefficient of redistribution. It finds the optimal couple that blocks hostile takeovers while minimizing the negative impact on the market due to too strong protection of the hard core to the detriment of dispersed shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno-Laurent Moschetto & Frédéric Teulon, 2014. "Optimisation d’une stratégie anti-OPA par limitation linéaire des droits de vote face à un investisseur hostile," Working Papers 2014-410, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-410
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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