Bolsa Família and Household Labour Supply
A common concern about social protection programmes is that the transfers they provide may create disincentives for work. By raising incomes, transfer payments may encourage households to seek more leisure time and reduce their participation in the labour force or the number of hours worked, even in poor households. Evidence from evaluation studies of conditional cash transfer programmes suggests that such concerns are overstated; most studies find no disincentive effects or, at most, modest reductions in labour supply (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).
|Date of creation:||Dec 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published by UNDP - International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth , December 2013, pages 1-1|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.ipc-undp.org|
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- Ariel Fiszbein & Norbert Schady & Francisco H.G. Ferreira & Margaret Grosh & Niall Keleher & Pedro Olinto & Emmanuel Skoufias, 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers : Reducing Present and Future Poverty," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2597.
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