On the Limits to Speculation in Centralized versus Decentralized Market Regimes
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- Zurita, Felipe, 2004. "On the limits to speculation in centralized versus decentralized market regimes," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 378-408, July.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Germain, Laurent, 2005. "Strategic noise in competitive markets for the sale of information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 179-209, April.
- Jie Zheng, 2008. "Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000038, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
- Jie Zheng, 2010. "Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002153, David K. Levine.
More about this item
KeywordsSpeculation; adverse selection; centralized markets;
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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