On the Limits to Speculation in Centralized versus Decentralized Market Regimes
Speculation creates an adverse selection cost for utility traders, who will choose not to trade if this cost exceeds the benefits of using the asset market. However, if they do not participate, the market collapses, since private information alone is not sufficient to create a motive for trade. Therefore, there is a limit to the amount of speculative transactions that a given market can support. We compare this limit in decentralized versus centralized market regimes, finding that the centralized regime is more prone to speculation than the decentralized one: the transaction fees charged by an intermediary diminish the individual return to information, so that for a fixed value of trading, more speculative transactions can be supported. The analysis also suggests a reason for the existence of intermediaries in financial markets.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published as "On the Limits to Speculation in Centralized vs. Decentralized Market Regimes", Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, pp. 378-408, 2004.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (562) 354-4303
Fax: (562) 553-1664
Web page: http://www.economia.puc.clEmail:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:196. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jaime Casassus)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.