IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ins/quaeco/qf0209.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is inflation a monetary phenomenon only? A non monetarist episode of inflation: the Italian case

Author

Listed:
  • Bertocco Giancarlo

    (Department of Economics, University of Insubria, Italy)

Abstract

The publication of the second edition of Fratianni and Spinelli's monetary History of Italy offers the opportunity to analyze the causes behind the inflation pattern in Italy in the three decades preceding the entry of the country in the European Monetary Union. The two authors reconstruct the monetary history of Italy using the monetarist theory as an interpretation scheme, and assert that the Italian experience represents a significant confirmation of the validity of that theoretical model. This paper has two objectives. The first consists in showing the limits of the explanation of Italian inflation based on the monetarist theory; the second consists in providing an alternative explanation whereby the pattern of Italian inflation basically depends on the trend of production costs and on the behavior of companies in connection with mark-up definition. This paper is subdivided into two parts. In part I, the summary of the most significant aspects of the monetarist interpretation is followed by a review of its weak points. In part II, an alternative interpretation of the evolution of inflation in Italy is presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertocco Giancarlo, 2002. "Is inflation a monetary phenomenon only? A non monetarist episode of inflation: the Italian case," Economics and Quantitative Methods qf0209, Department of Economics, University of Insubria.
    • Handle: RePEc:ins:quaeco:qf0209
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.eco.uninsubria.it/RePEc/pdf/QF2002_16.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allan H. Meltzer, 2001. "Money and monetary policy: an essay in honor of Darryl Francis," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 83(Jul), pages 23-32.
    2. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    3. Fratianni,Michele & Spinelli,Franco, 2005. "A Monetary History of Italy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521023450.
    4. Mishkin, Frederic S., 1998. "International Experiences With Different Monetary Policy Regimes," Seminar Papers 648, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    5. McCallum, Bennett T., 1999. "Issues in the design of monetary policy rules," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 1483-1530, Elsevier.
    6. Sun Bae Kim, 1991. "The independence of central banks," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue dec13.
    7. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, March.
    8. David H. Romer, 2000. "Keynesian Macroeconomics without the LM Curve," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 149-169, Spring.
    9. George T. McCandless & Warren E. Weber, 1995. "Some monetary facts," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 19(Sum), pages 2-11.
    10. Gerald P. Dwyer & Rik Hafer, 1988. "Is money irrelevant?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 3-17.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777.
    2. Anton Muscatelli & Carmine Trecroci, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules, Policy Preferences, and Uncertainty: Recent Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 597-627, December.
    3. Meixing DAI, 2009. "On the role of money growth targeting under inflation targeting regime," Working Papers of BETA 2009-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    4. Giancarlo Bertocco, 2007. "The characteristics of a monetary economy: a Keynes--Schumpeter approach," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 101-122, January.
    5. Vittorio Corbo, 2002. "Monetary Policy in Latin America in the 90s," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 6, pages 117-166, Central Bank of Chile.
    6. Wollmershauser, Timo, 2006. "Should central banks react to exchange rate movements? An analysis of the robustness of simple policy rules under exchange rate uncertainty," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 493-519, September.
    7. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    8. Dai, Meixing, 2011. "Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2609-2621.
    9. Takatoshi Ito & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2006. "Two Decades of Japanese Monetary Policy and the Deflation Problem," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy with Very Low Inflation in the Pacific Rim, pages 131-1997, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Bertocco Giancarlo, 2003. "The economics of financing firms: the role of banks," Economics and Quantitative Methods qf0312, Department of Economics, University of Insubria.
    11. Goran Petrevski & Jane Bogoev & Bruno Sergi, 2012. "The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 611-652.
    12. Hartmann, Daniel, 2001. "Taylor-Regel und amerikanische Geldpolitik," Violette Reihe: Schriftenreihe des Promotionsschwerpunkts "Globalisierung und Beschäftigung" 17/2001, University of Hohenheim, Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Evangelisches Studienwerk.
    13. Alex Cukierman, 2002. "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 84(Jul), pages 15-36.
    14. Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. "One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?," NBER Working Papers 8397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Dai, Meixing, 2007. "The design of a ‘two-pillar’ monetary policy strategy," MPRA Paper 14403, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
    16. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2006. "Signaling And Commitment: Monetary Versus Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(5), pages 595-624, November.
    17. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2014. "Inflation forecast contracts," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 26-40.
    18. Bonomo, Marco Antonio Cesar & Brito, Ricardo D., 2002. "Regras Monetárias e Dinâmica Macroeconômica no Brasil: Uma Abordagem de Expectativas Racionais," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 56(4), October.
    19. Francisco Rosende, 2002. "La Nueva Síntesis Keynesiana: Análisis e Implicancias de Política Monetaria," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 39(117), pages 203-233.
    20. Eric M. Leeper & Tao Zha, 2000. "Assessing simple policy rules: a view from a complete macro model," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ins:quaeco:qf0209. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Segreteria Dipartimento (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feinsit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.