Threats in Latin American and Caribbean countries: How do inequality and the asymmetries of rules affect tax morale?
Latin America is well known as the most inequitable region. As it is recognized, inequality and corruption perception weaken the way that political institutions works and the democratic system. Focusing on Latin American and Caribbean countries, we analyze what are the elements that shape tax morale. In particular, we analyze how the context influences on ethic decisions such as the predisposition to pay taxes. Our data source is the survey carried out in 2005 by Latinobarometro. In particular, our objective is to analyze how country performance is determining tax morale. To do so, we estimated four probit models including Gini index, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc). As expected we found that some socio-demographic variables play a relevant role. Interestingly, we also found that, in this attitude, LAC countries do not register a gender bias. However, those are not our main contributions to the literature on the field. The most important results are linked with: 1) the level matters, GDPpc increases the probability that people have tax morale, 2) moreover, income distribution also influence on tax morale but in opposite direction and 3) corruption perception also reduces tax morale. Those results show that the quality of institutions matters and therefore, the way that democracy works play a relevant role.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.ecineq.org|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benno Torgler, 2005.
"Tax morale in Latin America,"
Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 133-157, January.
- Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2007.
"The Evolution of Tax Morale in Modern Spain,"
School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series
224, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, revised 12 Aug 2008.
- Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2007. "The Evolution of Tax Morale in Modern Spain," Working Papers 03-2007, Institute of Local Public Finance.
- Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2007. "The Evolution of Tax Morale in Modern Spain," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0719, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Benno Torgler & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2005. "The Evolution of Tax Morale in Modern Spain," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0521, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Jorge Martinz-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2005. "The Evolution of Tax Morale in Modern Spain," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-33, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, .
"Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated,"
IEW - Working Papers
098, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2002. "Joint tax evasion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 35(3), pages 417-435, August.
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001.
"Corruption and optimal law enforcement,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
- Inna Cabelkova, 2001. "Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp176, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Inna Cabelkova, 2001. "Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?," Public Economics 0110004, EconWPA.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2009-143. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maria Ana Lugo)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.