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Political Particularism around the World

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  • Jessica Seddon Wallack
  • Alejandro Gaviria
  • Ugo Panizza
  • Ernesto H. Stein

Abstract

This paper presents a new dataset on electoral systems and outlines its potential uses in further research exploring the connections between electoral systems and economic outcomes. The dataset provides indicators of the degree to which individual politicians can further their careers by appealing to narrow geographic constituencies on the one hand, or party constituencies on the other.

Suggested Citation

  • Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2002. "Political Particularism around the World," Research Department Publications 4289, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4289
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    2. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
    3. Ugo, 2001. "Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 311-342, November.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    5. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," Working Papers 189, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1, January.
    7. Yianos Kontopoulos & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from OECD Countries," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 81-102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Baqir, Reza, 1999. "Districts, spillovers, and government overspending," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2192, The World Bank.
    9. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Introduction to "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance"," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bakker Femke E. & Rotondi Valentina, 2016. "Vote for Your Family! Particularism, Support for Democracy and Support for Shari’a in the Arab World," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 115-137, August.
    2. Brown, David S. & Touchton, Michael & Whitford, Andrew, 2011. "Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1516-1529, September.
    3. Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, "undated". "The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy - A Cross-Country Assessment," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1144, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    4. Richard G. Niemi & Michael J. Hanmer, 2010. "Voter Turnout Among College Students: New Data and a Rethinking of Traditional Theories," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(2), pages 301-323, June.
    5. Carlos Scartascini & Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi & Lee J. Alston & Marcus André Melo & Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira & Cristóbal Aninat & John Londregan & Patricio Navia , 2011. "El juego político en América Latina: ¿Cómo se deciden las políticas públicas?," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 42118 edited by Carlos Scartascini & Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi, February.
    6. Kåre Vernby, 2007. "Strikes are more common in countries with majoritarian electoral systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 65-84, July.
    7. Fumagalli, Eileen & Narciso, Gaia, 2012. "Political institutions, voter turnout, and policy outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 162-173.
    8. repec:idb:idbbks:332 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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