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El juego político en América Latina: ¿Cómo se deciden las políticas públicas?

Author

Listed:
  • Scartascini, Carlos
  • Spiller, Pablo T.
  • Stein, Ernesto H.
  • Tommasi, Mariano
  • Alston, Lee J.
  • Melo, Marcus André
  • Mueller, Bernardo
  • Pereira, Carlos
  • Aninat, Cristóbal
  • Londregan, John
  • Navia, Patricio
  • Vial, Joaquín
  • Cárdenas, Mauricio
  • Pachón, Mónica
  • Mejía Acosta, Andrés
  • Araujo, María Caridad
  • Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal
  • Saiegh, Sebastián
  • Lehoucq, Fabrice
  • Negretto, Gabriel
  • Aparicio, Francisco Javier
  • Nacif, Benito
  • Benton, Allyson Lucinda
  • Molinas, José R.
  • Montero, Marcela
  • Monaldi, Francisco
  • González de Pacheco, Rosa Amelia
  • Obuchi, Richard
  • Penfold, Michael

Abstract

¿Qué determina la capacidad de los países para diseñar, aprobar e implementar políticas públicas efectivas? Para abordar esta pregunta, este libro analiza el proceso de formulación de políticas en ocho países latinoamericanos en base a una metodología común con fundamentos en la teoría de juegos y el análisis institucional. Este análisis sistemático se concentra en estudiar tanto las instituciones políticas, y el funcionamiento de las instituciones y organizaciones políticas, como los resultados de las políticas. El resultado es un texto que se beneficia tanto de un detallado análisis sobre las complejidades del proceso de formulación de políticas en cada país por separado, como de un análisis interdisciplinario y comparativo de los procesos de formulación de políticas en la región.

Suggested Citation

  • Scartascini, Carlos & Spiller, Pablo T. & Stein, Ernesto H. & Tommasi, Mariano & Alston, Lee J. & Melo, Marcus André & Mueller, Bernardo & Pereira, Carlos & Aninat, Cristóbal & Londregan, John & Navia, 2011. "El juego político en América Latina: ¿Cómo se deciden las políticas públicas?," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 332, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:idbbks:332
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria Uribe & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto Stein, 2002. "Political particularism around the world," Informes de Investigación 3341, Fedesarrollo.
    2. Webb, Steven B., 2004. "Fiscal responsibility laws for subnational discipline : the Latin American experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3309, The World Bank.
    3. Miguel Urrutia, 1991. "On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 369-391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    5. Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto Stein, 2003. "Particularism around the World," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 17(1), pages 133-143, June.
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    1. Leonardo E. Letelier S. & Mireya D�vila A., 2015. "The Political Economics of Tax Reform in Chile," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(6), pages 832-850, December.
    2. Olavarria-Gambi Mauricio, 2017. "Policy Implementation: Lessons from the Chilean Policy on Public Management Modernization," Central European Journal of Public Policy, Sciendo, vol. 11(1), pages 41-54, June.

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