Übergänge von Alg-II-Beziehern in die erste Sanktion : Frauen werden nur selten sanktioniert

"Welfare recipients who without good cause do not cooperate with their job centre or who do not sufficiently search for jobs or training might face a temporary benefit sanction. This study describes first the institutional set-up of sanctions against welfare benefit recipients in Germany and its changes since the introduction of the Social Code II in the year 2005. Second, our duration analysis estimates the individual transition rates into a first benefit sanction after entering welfare receipt. The analysis presents results for men and women in East and West Germany separately. Moreover, we distinguish between further population groups, in order to show to what extent the transition rates into a first sanction vary with age, the highest schooling degree, nationality, and family status. The study analyses an inflow sample into welfare during the period April 2006 to March 2008 that was drawn from administrative micro data. It considers two different types of first sanctions. Sanctions that lead to a relatively strong reduction of the welfare benefit by an amount of 30 per cent (100 per cent for those aged below 25 years) of the base cash benefit, and mild sanctions leading to a cut of 10 per cent of the base cash benefit. In the period under review both sanctions also implied the temporary loss of an additional part of the welfare benefit that until the year 2011 was granted to people who exhausted their unemployment insurance benefit within the previous two years. Severe sanctions may be imposed if, for example, a welfare recipient refuses a job offer or a placement into an active labour market programme, whereas mild sanctions may be imposed for missing an appointment with job centre staff or a medical examination. The transition rates into a first sanction tend to decrease with time since entry into welfare receipt. Our analysis shows that men face much higher sanction rates than women. This result holds for all sub-groups under investigation. Welfare recipients aged at least 50 years face extremely low transition rates into benefit sanctions, while those aged less than 25 years are characterised by the highest ones. The latter result reflects that young welfare recipients are a special target group that in the period under review was supposed to be placed immediately after the start of their welfare receipt into jobs, training or work opportunities, implying a much greater scope for non-cooperation with the job centres. A high schooling degree is associated with a very low transition rate into the first benefit sanction. Moreover, having young children aged less than three years implies extremely low transition rates into benefit sanctions for their mothers; due to child-rearing they do not have to be available for job placement. However, for fathers of children aged less than three years the transition rates are relatively high in West Germany." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))